

11.3 Weighted Voting Systems

Rank any number of options in your order of preference.

☐ Joe Smith
☒ 1 John Citizen
☒ 3 Jane Doe
☐ Fred Rubble
☒ 2 Mary Hill

Rate each between -10 and 10

☒ 7 Joe Smith
☒ 10 John Citizen
☒ -3 Jane Doe
☒ 0 Fred Rubble
☒ 10 Mary Hill

1

There are different voting systems to the ones we've looked at.

Instead of focusing on the candidates, let's focus on the voters.

2

In a **weighted voting system**, the votes of some voters matters more than others.

Here, we will not have a "one person, one vote" principle.

Example: a stockholder with more shares has more of an effect on corporate policy than a stockholder with fewer shares.

3

The **weight** of a voter is the number of votes they have for an issue.

A **quota** of votes is the number of votes need to get an issue passed.

4

DEFINITIONS A **weighted voting system** with n voters is described by a set of numbers that are listed in the following format:

[quota: weight of voter 1, weight of voter 2, . . . , weight of voter n]

The **quota** is the number of votes necessary in this system to get a resolution passed. The numbers that follow, called **weights**, are the amount of votes controlled by voter 1, voter 2, etc.

5

Weighted Voting Systems

• Example: Explain the weighted voting system.
 [51 : 26, 26, 12, 12, 12, 12]

• Solution: The following diagram describes how to interpret this system.

Need 51 votes to pass a resolution. [51 : 26, 26, 12, 12, 12, 12]
 A and B each have 26 votes. C, D, E, and F have 12 votes each.

Examples:

[3 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]

[10: 2, 2, 2, 5, 5]

[100: 1, 2, 3, 2]

7

Weighted Voting Systems

- Example: Explain the weighted voting system.

[14 : 15, 2, 3, 3, 5]

- Solution: Voter 1 is a *dictator*.

The quota is 14.

The dictator is the only person
able to pass a resolution.

[14 : 15, 2, 3, 3, 5]

10/02/13
© 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.

8

Section 12.3, Slide 8

Any voters that vote the same way is
called a **coalition**.

A **winning coalition** is a coalition that can
always pass an issue / meets the quota.

9

Example: Find coalitions of voters.
Determine if they are winning coalitions.

[10: 2, 2, 4, 4, 4]

10

Recall the subsets of a set.

The set {a,b,c} has subsets:

{}
{a} {b} {c}
{a,b} {a,c} {b,c}
{a,b,c}

11

Example: A quota of 8 votes.
There are 3 voting groups: A, B, C
A has 5 votes, B has 3 votes and C has 4 votes.
Which subsets of {A,B,C} are a winning coalition?

12

Example: A quota of 8 votes.
 There are 3 voting groups: A, B, C
 A has 5 votes, B has 3 votes and C has 4 votes.
 Which subsets of {A,B,C} are a winning coalition?

{A}	5	
{B}	3	
{C}	4	
{A,B}	8	winning
{A,C}	9	winning
{B,C}	7	
{A,B,C}	12	winning

13

DEFINITION A voter in a winning coalition is called **critical** if it is the case that if he or she were to leave the coalition, then the coalition would no longer be winning.

14

Example: Who is critical to get 8 votes?

{A}	5	
{B}	3	
{C}	4	
{A,B}	8	winning
{A,C}	9	winning
{B,C}	7	
{A,B,C}	12	winning

15

Example: Who is critical to get 8 votes?

			critical
{A}	5		
{B}	3		
{C}	4		
{A,B}	8	winning	A, B
{A,C}	9	winning	A, C
{B,C}	7		
{A,B,C}	12	winning	A (more than 8 votes if B or C removed)

16

DEFINITION In a weighted voting system, a voter's **Banzhaf power index** is defined as

$$\frac{\text{the number of times the voter is critical in winning coalitions}}{\text{the total number of times voters are critical in winning coalitions}}$$

17

Compute the Banzhaf Power Index for A, B, C.

			critical
{A}	5		
{B}	3		
{C}	4		
{A,B}	8	winning	A, B
{A,C}	9	winning	A, C
{B,C}	7		
{A,B,C}	12	winning	A

18

Compute the Banzhaf Power Index for A, B, C.

			critical	
{A}	5			
{B}	3			
{C}	4			
{A,B}	8	winning	A, B	(Note: total critical voters is 5 = 3+1+1)
{A,C}	9	winning	A, C	
{B,C}	7			
{A,B,C}	12	winning	A	

A critical 3 times, B critical 1 time, C critical 1 time

Banzhaf Power Index

A : $3/(3+1+1)$ B : $1/(3+1+1)$ C : $1/(3+1+1)$

Example: Quota of 10
Weights: R 9, D 8, I 3

Coalition	Weight		Critical Voters
{R}	9		
{D}	8		
{I}	3		
{R, D}	17	Winning	R, D
{R, I}	12	Winning	R, I
{D, I}	11	Winning	D, I
{R, D, I}	20	Winning	none

Remove any of these voters and the coalition no longer wins.

$$\frac{\text{the number of times R is critical in winning coalitions}}{\text{the total number of times voters are critical in winning coalitions}} = \frac{2}{6} = \frac{1}{3}$$

Q is a senior partner. R,S,T are all associates.
To pass a motion, a senior partner and at least 2 associates need to vote in favor.
Find all coalitions and the BPI for each.

21

Q is a senior partner. R,S,T are all associates.
To pass a motion, a senior partner and at least 2 associates need to vote in favor.
Find all coalitions and the BPI for each.

Winning Coalitions:

{ Q, R, S } { Q, R, T } { Q, S, T } { Q, R, S, T }

Critical Voters:

Q, R, S Q, R, T Q, S, T Q

Total critical voters in winning coalitions: 10

Banzhaf Power Index:

Q : 4/10 R : 2/10 S : 2/10 T : 2/10

22

The Banzhaf Power Index

• Example: A law has two senior partners (Krooks and Cheatum) and four associates (W, X, Y, and Z). To change any major policy of the firm, Krooks, Cheatum, and at least two associates must vote for the change. Calculate the Banzhaf power index for each member of this firm.

• Need K and C, need at least 2 of W, X, Y, and Z

10/02/13

© 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.

(continued on next slide)

Section 12.3, Slide 24

The Banzhaf Power Index

• Solution: We use {K, C, W, X, Y, Z} to represent the firm. Since every winning coalition includes {K, C} and any two of the other associates, we only need to determine the subsets of {W, X, Y, Z} with two or more members to determine the winning coalitions.

2-Element Subsets of {W, X, Y, Z}	3-Element Subsets of {W, X, Y, Z}	4-Element Subsets of {W, X, Y, Z}
{W, X}, {W, Y}, {W, Z}, {X, Y}, {X, Z}, {Y, Z}	{W, X, Y}, {W, X, Z}, {W, Y, Z}, {X, Y, Z}	{W, X, Y, Z}

10/02/13

© 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.

(continued on next slide)

Section 12.3, Slide 25

The Banzhaf Power Index

The winning coalitions and critical members are:

	Winning Coalitions	Critical Members
1	{K, C, W, X}	K, C, W, X
2	{K, C, W, Y}	K, C, W, Y
3	{K, C, W, Z}	K, C, W, Z
4	{K, C, X, Y}	K, C, X, Y
5	{K, C, X, Z}	K, C, X, Z
6	{K, C, Y, Z}	K, C, Y, Z
7	{K, C, W, X, Y}	K, C
8	{K, C, W, X, Z}	K, C
9	{K, C, W, Y, Z}	K, C
10	{K, C, X, Y, Z}	K, C
11	{K, C, W, X, Y, Z}	K, C

All voters are necessary to pass a resolution in these coalitions.

Only K and C are critical in these coalitions.

10/02/13

© 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.

(continued on next slide)

Section 12.3, Slide 26

The Banzhaf Power Index

K and C are critical members 11 times, whereas W, X, Y, and Z are each critical members only 3 times. We may compute the Banzhaf power index for each member.

Members	Banzhaf Power Index
K, C	$\frac{11}{11 + 11 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3} = \frac{11}{34}$
W, X, Y, Z	$\frac{3}{11 + 11 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3} = \frac{3}{34}$

10/02/13

© 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.

26

Section 12.3, Slide 27